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FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS:




"Family limited partnerships [hereinafter FLPs] are a commonly used
vehicle through which wealth is transferred from one generation to the
next." In general, a FLP is a limited partnership where all of the partners are
family members or family trusts.2 The general partners have complete con-
trol over the management of the partnership and its assets. The limited part-
ners are passive investors who have no say over the day-to-day management
of the affairs of the partnership. 3 Typically, "[t]he donors (commonly the
parents or grandparents) [retain] the general partnership interest ... and over
time, make gifts of limited partnership interests to the donees (commonly the
children or grandchildren)."'
A significant tax benefit of a FLP is a potential valuation discount avail-
able for the gifts of limited partnership interests to the limited partners.'
"When valuing FLP interests, courts consistently apply [ ] discounts for lack
of control and lack of marketability."' "The availability of these discounts
allows gifts of ownership interests to be made at values less than the propor-
tionate share of the fair market value of the underlying assets."7 Although
similar, "[a] minority-interest discount recognizes the limited partner's lack
of control within the partnership; [whereas] a lack-of-marketability discount
recognizes the inability of a limited partner to transfer his interest in the part-
nership. "8
The Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter IRS] has applied a number of
different legal theories in challenging the use of FLPs to produce valuation
discounts, although their arguments have generally been rejected by the
courts? One of the more litigious issues between the IRS and taxpayers is
the quantification of lack of control and lack of marketability discounts as
applied to partial ownership interests in FLPs. This note will explore the
development of the IRS's challenges to FLPs, analyze the Lappo Family
1. Leslie A. Droubay, Comment, The Certainty of Death and Taxes for Family Limited Partnerships, 7
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 523, 524 (2003).







9. Id. at 526.
10. Id.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
Limited Partnership, and compare its resulting litigation to two other recent
tax court decisions concerning valuation of discounts.
II. FACTS
On October 20, 1995, Clarissa Lappo, the petitioner, and her daughter
Clarajane formed the Lappo Family Limited Partnership." On April 19,
1996, an initial capital contribution of marketable securities (principally
municipal bonds) and certain parcels of Michigan real estate were conveyed
to the partnership. 12 The initial partnerships interests were as follows:
Partner General Interest Limited Interest Total
Clarissa 1.0 98.7 99.7
Clarajane .2 .1 .3
Total 1.2 98.8 100.013
Initial partnership interests were allocated based on the market value of
the assets contributed to the partnership as of December 31, 1995.14 The mar-
ket value of the securities was $1,318,609 and the appraised value of the land
was $1,860,000.5
On April 19, 1996, Clarissa transferred 69.4815368 percent of her limited
partnership interest between Clarajane, as Trustee of the Lappo Generation
Trust, and each of the four individual grandchildren. 6 On July 2, 1996,
Clarissa gave her remaining limited partnership interest to Clarajane in her
individual capacity." Consequently, after these gifts, the partnership inter-
ests were as follows:
Partner General Interest Limited Interest Total
Clarissa 1.0 - 1.0000000
Clarajane .2 29.3184632 29.5184632
Lappo Generation
Trust - 66.8091700 66.8091700
1 st grandchild - .6680917 .6680917
2nd grandchild - .6680917 .6680917
3rd grandchild - .6680917 .6680917
4th grandchild .6680917 .6680917
Total 1.2 98.8000000 100.000000018
11. Lappo v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2003-258, at 1431-32 (2003).
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As typical in many FLPs, the partnership agreement provided that all
management authority resided in the general partners; the FLP terminated if
there was no general partner; rules for withdrawing capital or taking distribu-
tions were spelled out; any withdrawal of capital would be paid in cash; any
amounts contributed to, or accumulated in, the partnership were not entitled
to interest; limited partnership interests could be assigned but the assignee
would not receive any rights other than the right to distribution; assignees
would not become a limited partner; the partnership had a right of first
refusal if a limited partner wished to sell his or her interest; the partnership
had the right to purchase limited partnership interests that were available due
to death or a transfer by operation of law; and the partnership would termi-
nate in 2045, unless a prior termination had already occurred. 9
The petitioner filed a gift tax return in April 1997, valuing her April 1996
gifts of limited partnership interests at $1,040,000 and paid $153,000 in gift
tax. In February 1998, the petitioner amended her gift tax return to include
the gift she made to her daughter in July 1996 valued at $423,871 with
$177,265 in additional tax being remitted."
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency in June 2001, stating the 1996 gifts
should have been valued at $3,137,287, resulting in an additional tax bill of
$998,508, less the $177,265 in tax that was paid on the July 1996 gift.22
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Family Limited Partnerships
1. Development of Family Limited Partnerships
Family partnerships were a common vehicle first used for tax purposes
principally to shift income from higher income tax bracket members to lower
income tax bracket members.2 In 1946, the Supreme Court refused to recog-
nize family partnerships unless each partner provided original capital, vital
services, substantially contributed to control and management of the partner-
ship or all of the above.2" This position disallowed the concept of partnership
interests being created by gifts. The Supreme Court clarified this position
three years later by reaffirming that a purported partner must contribute capi-
tal or services to the partnership, but held that the capital need not originate
with the partner or the services be "vital.."25 However, the facts and circum-
stances must show that the parties "in good faith and acting with a
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1432-33.
20. Id. at 1433.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Comm'r v, Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
24. Id. at 290.
25. Co mrn'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 744 (1949).
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business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enter-
prise."26 The Court, in determining good faith, looked to the parties' agree-
ment, conduct, statements, relationship, respective abilities and capital contri-
butions, their actual control of partnership income, and testimony of disinter-
ested persons.27 Subsequently, Congress enacted § 191 and § 3797(a)(2) of
the 1939 Code. These sections were carried forward into the 1954 and 1986
Codes as § 704(e).28 Section 704(e) currently recognizes a partner for federal
income tax purposes if he or she "owns a capital interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not [the]
interest was derived by purchase or gift from another person."29 As a result,
family partnership interests are often gifted from donors to donees.
2. Valuation of the Partnership
Once the fact of a partnership is established, the fair market value of a
partnership interest is determined. Fair market value is "the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not
under any compulsion to sell, and both parties having reasonable knowledge
of relevant facts."" "The standard is an objective test using hypothetical buy-
ers and sellers;" it is not a personalized transaction between a particular
buyer and seller. 1 Fair market value, being a question of fact, is dependant
upon circumstances in each case.32 "No formula can be devised [to be]
applicable to the multitude of different valuation issues arising in estate and
gift tax cases. '
3. Minority Discounts
A lack of control discount, or a minority interest discount, is appropriate
when valuing an interest in an entity in which the holder of the interest has no
right to decide timing of distributions, liquidation of the entity and other mat-
ters affecting the ownership interest.'
The IRS has changed its position on minority interest discounts over
time. On January 26, 1993, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 93-12 stating "a
minority discount will not be disallowed solely because a transferred interest,
when aggregated with other interests held by family members, would be a...
controlling interest."" Prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 93-12, the
26. Id. at 744-45.
27. Id.
28. I.R.C. § 704 (2000).
29. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (2000).
30. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965), 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992).
31. LeFrak v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (RIA) P 93,526, at 2810 (1993).
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IRS attempted to enforce Revenue Ruling 81-253. Revenue Ruling 81-253
held no minority shareholder discount is allowed with respect to transfers of
shares of stock between family members if, based upon a composite of the
family members' interests at the time of transfer, control of the corporation
exists in the family unit. 6 In essence, the IRS attributed the control held by
the family as a whole to each family member's partial interest. In spite of
Revenue Ruling 81-253, key court cases upheld the application of minority
interest discounts to family ownership interests. 7 As a result of these cases
and the issuance of Revenue Ruling 93-12, Revenue Ruling 81-253 has been
revoked. 8
4. Marketability Discounts
A lack of marketability discount takes into account the difficulty in find-
ing a willing buyer for an interest in a non-publicly traded entity rather than
finding a willing buyer for an interest in a publicly traded entity. 9 Additional
expenses may be incurred, such as legal, accounting, and syndication fees, in
order to sell the interest. The price of publicly traded interests reflect a lack
of control discount but not a lack of marketability discount as they are sold
on a recognized exchange, and by definition they are marketable. In contrast,
a closely held interest is subject to both minority and marketability discounts.
B. IRS Challenges to FLPs
The gift tax regime requires a two-part inquiry - a determination of the
property transferred by gift and the valuation of the transferred property at
the date of gift.4"
1. Identifying the property transferred
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on property transferred by
gift. 1 The gift tax applies "whether the gift [is in trust or otherwise], ...
direct or indirect, and whether the property is real[,] personal, tangible or
intangible .... ."" Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, the excess of the value of the
property transferred over the value of the consideration is a gift except to the
36. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 253..
37. Estate of Bright v. U.S., 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
38. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202; see also Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate
of Lee v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 860 (1978).
39. Id.
40. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 251 1(a), 2512 (2000); Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1 (as amended in 1997), 25.2511-2
(as amended in 1999), 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
41. I.R.C. § 2501 (2000).
42. I.R.C. § 2511(a) (2000).
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extent the transfer is in the ordinary course of business, i.e., it is bona fide, at
arm's length, and free from donative intent." As a result, the transfer of
assets to a partnership for less than adequate and full consideration consti-
tutes an indirect gift from the transferor partner to the other partners." In a
FLP, the first inquiry becomes whether the property transferred by gift is an
interest in a partnership or, in substance, a gift of an interest in the underlying
assets owned by the entity."
a. Economic Substance
For years, "courts have applied the economic substance doctrine, or a vari-
ant thereof... to disregard... transactions and entities.., devoid of economic
substance" solely generated for tax benefits." Legal documents do not control
for tax purposes when objective economic realities are to the contrary. 7
The inquiry into whether [a] transaction [ ] ha[s] sufficient
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on
both the 'objective economic substance of the transactions'
[practical economic consequences, other than the creation of
tax benefits] and the 'subjective business motivation' behind
them [valid business purpose or profit motive] .... [T]hese
distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not consti-
tute discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step analysis,' but rather
represent related factors both of which inform the analysis of
whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from
its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes. "8
A fundamental principle of taxation is that "even where the 'form of the
taxpayer's activities indisputably satisfie[s] the literal requirements' of the
[law], the courts must examine 'whether the substance of those transactions
was consistent with their form,' . . . because a transaction that is 'devoid of
economic substance ... simply is not recognized for federal taxation purpos-
e s .
' 4 9
The determination of economic substance is a question of fact which
sometimes results in conflicting determinations based on similar facts. In
43. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
44. Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(h)(1) (as amended in 1997).
45. F.S.A. 2001 43 004 (October. 26, 2001).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Casebeer v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d
1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990)).
49. ACMP'ship, 157 F.3d at 246 (quoting Lerman v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, the court disallowed a minority discount
for transfer tax purposes because the partnership transaction lacked substance
and was devised solely to reduce transfer tax liability.5" However, in Estate
of Strangi v. Commissioner, a case with substantially similar facts, the same
court considered another partnership to be validly formed when the prover-
bial "i's were dotted" and "t's were crossed."" A partnership, as a legal mat-
ter, must change the relationships between the decedent and his heirs and
creditors. 2 "Regardless of subjective intentions, [a] partnership [must have]
sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes."53 Minimal formali-
ties have been sufficient, as an example, in Estate of Knight v. Commissioner
even though the partnership kept no records, prepared no annual reports, had
no employees, and the partners and/or representatives never met and never
discussed any business activity of the partnership, the court determined
potential purchasers would not disregard the existence of a partnership.' The
Tax Court seems willing to respect a business entity for estate and gift tax
purposes when a hypothetical willing buyer would not disregard the entity.5
In recent cases the court disregarded the IRS's argument that a partnership
should be disregarded for federal tax purposes because it lacked economic
substance and business purpose.5
b. Gift on Formation
Gift tax is "not imposed upon the receipt of [] property by the donee,
nor is it necessarily determined by the measure of enrichment resulting to the
donee from the transfer, nor is it conditioned [on the] ability to identify the
donee at the time of the transfer."" Rather, gift tax "is measured by the value
of property passing from the donor, and attaches regardless of the fact that
the identity of the donee may not then be known or ascertainable."58 It is an
excise on the donor's act of transfer.
59
"The 'gift on formation' . . . argument is based on the theory that the dif-
ference between the value of assets contributed to an entity ... and the value
of the interest in the entity received by the transferor constitutes a gift."6
This argument focuses solely on the transferor's initial transfer of assets to
the entity and the resulting consideration received by the transferor for those
50. Estate of Murphy v. Comm'r, 59 T.C.M. (RIA) 90,472,2257 (1990).
51. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 486 (2000) (rev'd in part on other grounds Estate of
Strangi v. C.I.R., 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 486-87.
54. Estate of Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 511 (2000).
55. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
56. Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2002-246, at 1521-22 (2002).
57. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (as amended in 1997).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
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assets 1.6  The argument assumes that the transaction is a bona fide sale and
therefore requires a "determination of whether the consideration received by
the transferor (the partnership interest or corporate stock) is 'full and ade-
quate consideration in money or money's worth"' for the assets transferred.6"
The IRS prevailed in its argument in Shepherd v. Commissioner where
the donor contributed property to the partnership and half the value was
immediately allocated to the capital accounts of the donor's children.63
"[T]he court held that the donor [ ] made a gift of [fifty percent] of the con-
tributed assets to [the] children, as opposed to gifts of partnership interests."'
This result makes sense when the donor's capital contributions are immedi-
ately credited to other capital accounts. 65 In substance, it is similar to gifting
the capital contributions to other partners who then contribute them to the
partnership. 66 Had "the donor in Shepherd v. Commissioner . . . created a
valid partnership,. . . taken a partnership interest corresponding to the contri-
bution of assets and [then] gifted half of the interest to [the] children," he
would have avoided the gift on formation trap. 67 In Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, the court rejected a gift on formation argument where the
partnership agreement credited only the donor's capital account upon receipt
of the donor's assets followed by subsequent gifts of the donor's interests to
the donees6 8 It appears that, "as long as certain formalities are followed,...
the 'gift on formation' argument should not apply."69
c. Retention of Control
The IRS has successfully attacked the validity of FLPs where the trans-
feror retains control of the property.7" Formation of a FLP requires care in
asset ownership and receipt of income. Ownership of the assets must be
transferred to the FLP and income of the assets must be received by the FLP
and deposited in FLP accounts. Otherwise, the IRS will take the position the
decedent retained the benefit of the property requiring inclusion in the dece-
dent's estate under IRC § 2036(a)."1 In Estate of Schauerhamer v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court sustained an IRS attack that the assets in the
FLP should be included in the decedent's estate where she received checks
issued to the FLP and deposited them into her personal account.72
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFr TAXATION 10.02 [2][c][v] (8th ed. 2002) (cit-







70. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
71. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
72. Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (RIA) P 97, 242, at 1505-06 (1997).
[VOL. 24:49
2005] FAMILYLIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: THE PARTS CAN BE WORTHLESS THAN THE WHOLE 57
A properly formed partnership consistently operated should prevail in a
retained control challenge under IRC § 2036(a)(1), but may still be vulnera-
ble to attack under IRC § 2036(a)(2). In general, this section operates to pull
the property over which the decedent held the power to determine who, other
than the decedent, will receive the income from the property into the dece-
dent's gross estate.7 3 The Tax Court defined parameters for the application
of IRC § 2036(a)(2) in that there must be independent control of assets or
constraint on the decision making process such as economic realities of a
business purpose or a fiduciary duty to the other owners in order to withstand
a challenge under IRC § 2036(a)(2).74
The Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner court held that the decedent's
estate must include the value of his assets transferred by him during his life-
time to a FLP where he retained extensive control over key decisions affect-
ing the distribution of money among partners. An asset transferor who
becomes sole general partner appears to be the most at risk to the retention of
control argument and should consider multiple general partners or an inde-
pendent third party.
2. The Value of Transferred Property
The value of any transferred property interest is determined by applying
the appropriate valuation standard. 6 Fair market value is defined as "the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."77 "This objective test
requires [that] property [ ] be valued from the viewpoint of a hypothetical
buyer and seller, [with each seeking to maximize] profit from any transaction
involving the property. 78
In addition to the fair market valuation standard, special valuation rules
contained in Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code may apply to transac-
tions involving FLPs.7 9 Congress enacted Chapter 14 in 1990 to replace §
2036(c), which had been enacted in 1987 to prevent the use of estate valua-
tion freezing techniques that were perceived to be abusive. 80 Under former §
2036(c), transferred property and interests in property were brought back into
the transferor's estate if the transferor transferred a disproportionate share of
the future appreciation to younger family members and retained rights to
73. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (2000).
74. F.S.A. 2000 49 003 (Dec. 8, 2000).
75. Estate ofStrangi, 115 T.C. at 480.
76. F.S.A. 2001 43 004 (October 26, 2001).
77. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 (as amended in 1965), 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992).
78. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
79. I.R.C. § 2701 (2000).
80. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
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income or management.81 As interpreted by the IRS, it applied to many
arrangements passing property and interests in property to younger family
members and required complex calculations to determine the amount later
included in the transferor's estate.82 Adopting a different approach, Chapter
14 applies at the time of the initial transfer with resulting gifts upon a trans-
fer of a retained interest or the death of the transferor.
a. The Effect of Restrictions on Transferred Property
The value of any property is determined for transfer tax purposes without
regard to any right or restriction relating to the property.13 Restrictions
include "[a]ny option, agreement, or other right to acquire or use the property
at a price less than the fair market value [of the property] (determined with-
out regard to the option, agreement or right); or [a]ny restriction on the right
to sell or use the property."' Such restrictions include restrictions on the
owner's right to require the entity to buy the owner's interest at a reasonable
price or on the right to transfer the owner's interest to third parties without
unreasonable restrictions.85 The IRS has attempted to expand the reach of §
2703 by arguing that the entity itself may be disregarded under § 2703 with
the result that for transfer tax purposes a transfer of an interest in the entity is
treated as a transfer of an interest in the underlying assets held by the entity.
8 6
Accordingly, the IRS will not allow a discount to a transfer of an interest in
an entity holding marketable securities, and only allows a fractionalization
discount, presumably less than a combined lack of control and lack of mar-
ketability discount, to a transfer of other kinds of investments including real
estate. This position disregards the fundamental precept of federal transfer
taxation that state law determines the property rights includible in a dece-
dent's estate.8 8 The Tax Court specifically rejected this IRS position in
Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, finding that neither the statute nor the
regulations support valuing the underlying assets of a partnership rather than
the partnership interest held by the transferor or decedent. 9
There are two exceptions to § 2703, one statutory and one regulatory.
Under the regulatory exception, a right or restriction on the interest's value is
not ignored when the family owns less than 50% of the value or voting rights
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2) (2000).
84. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(2) (1992).
85. Id.
86. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 97 36 004 (June 6, 1997), 97 35 003 (May 8, 1997), 97 30 004 (April 3, 1997),
97 25 002 (Mar. 3, 1997), 97 23 009 (Feb. 24, 1997), 97 19 006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
87. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
88. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Bosch Estate, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509
(1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
89. Reed W. Easton, Courts Affirm Family Limited Partnership Technique -Service Vows to Fight On, 5
VALUATION STRATEGIES 10 (2002).
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in the entity." Under the statutory exception, a right or restriction that satis-
fies the three requirements of § 2703(a) will not be disregarded." It appears
that a restriction that is commercially reasonable will not be disregarded in
valuing an interest in a family-controlled business. 2 However, the IRS has
held that the series of transactions (the creation and funding of the partner-
ship and the transfer of partnership interests) are in substance one integrated
transaction subject to the partnership agreement resulting in a transfer of the
underlying partnership assets and ignoring the partnership agreement.93
b. Restrictions on Liquidation
When valuing a transfer of interest in a controlled entity to a family
member, restrictions on the ability to liquidate the entity are disregarded if
they are more limiting than state partnership law.94 Section 2704(b) attacks
valuation discounts based on restrictions on the ability of an entity to liqui-
date. This provision determines the value of an ownership interest in the
entity by disregarding certain features which would otherwise be taken into
account in determining fair market value." Section 2704(b) applies only if
there is a transfer of an interest in an entity to a member of the transferor's
family and the transferor and members of his family control the entity imme-
diately before the transfer. 7 In essence, "applicable restrictions" are disre-
garded under § 2704(b).9 8 An applicable restriction is a restriction limiting
the ability of an entity to liquidate.9 9 In addition to being an applicable
restriction, either (1) the restriction must lapse, in whole or in part, after the
interest in the entity has been transferred or (2) the transferor or any member
of his family, alone or collectively, must have the right to remove the restric-
tion after the transfer.
100
The IRS has lost § 2704(b) challenges in a number of cases. The court in
Kerr v. Commissioner concluded that partnership agreements providing for
dissolution on a specific date or by agreement of all the partners were no
more restrictive than the state law."°' In Harper v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court held that the limitations on liquidation contained in a California part-
nership agreement are not applicable restrictions within the meaning of §
2704(b).' °2 The Tax Court held, in a similar situation, that the provisions of a
90. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3) (1992).
91. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1) (1992).
92. Church v. United States, 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-428 at 811 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
93. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
94. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1992).
95. I.R.C. § 2704(b) (2000).
96. F.S.A. 2001 43 004.
97. Id.
98. I.R.C. § 2704(b) (2000).
99. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(2)(B) (2000).
100. 1d.
101. Kerr v. Conmm'r, 113 T.C. 449,472-74 (1999).
102. Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2000-202, at 1145-46 (2000).
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Texas partnership agreement relating to dissolution and lack of withdrawal
rights were not applicable restrictions under § 2704(b).103 In Estate of Jones
v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that provisions in two Texas partner-
ship agreements addressing the right to liquidate the partnerships do not con-
stitute applicable § 2704(b) restrictions and need not be disregarded when
determining the value of the partnership interests that the decedent trans-
ferred by gift.1"4
c. Allowance of Lack of Control and Lack of Marketability Discounts
Quantification issues in valuation and discount cases permeate this area.
"We approximate that 243 sections of the Code require fair market value
estimates in order to assess tax liability, and that 15 million tax returns are
filed each year on which taxpayers report an event involving a valuation-
related issue."' 15 Valuation is a highly sophisticated process. We cannot real-
istically expect that litigants will be able to, or will want to, settle, rather than
litigate, their valuation controversies if the law relating to valuation is vague
or unclear.
Although the FLP continues to be a popular tax-planning vehicle, the
IRS and the courts view many FLP's discounts with skepticism. When a tax-
payer shows a FLP should be respected, interests in the FLP and not its
underlying assets are valued for transfer tax purposes. The amount of any
valuation discounts are "established through the testimony of a qualified
expert."'1 06
Three cases decided in the summer of 2003, McCord v. Commissioner,
Lappo v. Commissioner, and Peracchio v. Commissioner, all involve FLPs
holding multiple investments. 07 Initial attempts to disqualify the partnership
form were abandoned or defeated resulting in valuation issues exclusively.'08
All three cases presented experts with impressive credentials on both sides,
and the court rejected the experts' conclusions in these three cases and
formed its own conclusions from empirical data. 9
IV. INSTANT CASE
Lappo v. Commissioner provides a roadmap for valuation professionals
to help in assembling evidence to determine the amount of valuation dis-
counts."0
103. Estate of Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 519-20 (2000).
104. Estate of Jones v. Conmm'r, 116 T.C. 121 (2001).
105. Estate of Auker v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (RA) P 98,185 at 1011 (1998).
106. F.S.A. 2000 49 003.
107. McCord v. Conin'r, 120 T.C. 358 (2003); Lappo, 84 T.C.M. (RA) at 1429; Peracchio v. Comm'r,
84 T.C.M. (RA) P 2003-280 at 1535 (2003).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Lappo, 84 T.C.M. (RA) P 2003-258.
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In addition to the valuation issue, the notice of deficiency
cited three other contentions: (1) lack of economic substance
to the partnership's formation and operation; (2) the partner-
ship interests should be valued without regard to any restric-
tion on the right to use or sell the property within the mean-
ing of § 2703(a)(2); and (3) a taxable gift was made upon for-
mation of the partnership.'
However, these alternative contentions were subsequently withdrawn result-
ing in a pure valuation quantification case.12
The parties agreed on the method for determining fair market value of
the partnership's assets (i.e., marketable securities and real estate) i.e., fair
market value is the net asset value [hereinafter NAV] reduced by lack of con-
trol (minority interest) and marketability discounts. '1 3 The parties generally
agreed on the NAV of the marketable securities and real estate,"' although
they disagreed on the minority interest and marketability discounts." After
the assessment of additional tax was made, the petitioner bore the burden of
proof."6
A. Expert Opinions
The court evaluated the expert opinions in light of the evidence and
accepted or rejected the expert testimony, in whole or in part, according to
the courts' rationale.1 7 "The persuasiveness of an expert's opinion
depend[ed] largely upon the disclosed facts on which it [was] based." '18
Selective use of any part of an expert's opinion is within the discretion of the
court.1 1 9
Petitioner's expert determined the components of the total discount to be:
7.5 % lack of control discount with respect to the marketable securities; 35%
lack of control discount with respect to the real estate portion of petitioner's
April 19, 1996 gifts; 30% percent lack of control discount with respect to the
real estate portion of petitioner's July 2, 1996 gift; and a 35% marketability
111. Id. at 1433n,2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1433.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1433 n.3. "This agreed-upon value of the real estate is based on an appraisal report dated Jan.
24, 1996, and represents the market value of the leased fee estate as determined by an independent appraiser
using a discounted cashflow analysis."
116. Id. at 1433.
117. Id. (citing Helvering v. NatI. Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938); Shepherd, 115 T.C. 376 (2000),
aff'd 283 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2002); Estate of Newhouse v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 193,217 (1990)).
118. Lappo, 84 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2003-258 at 1434 (quoting Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 530, 538
(1998)); see Tripp v. Comm'r, 337 F.2d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1964), affg 22 T.C.M. (CCH) P 1225 (1963).
119. Id.
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discount for each gift. 2 ' Therefore, a total discount of 50.4% applied at April
19, 1996 and 48.2% at July 2, 1996.121
Respondent's expert determined a lack of control discount of 8.5% and a
marketability discount of 8.3%.122 The expert's determinations resulted in a
total discount of 16.1%.123
The court ultimately allowed an 8.5% discount for lack of control to
apply to the marketable securities, a 19% discount for lack of control to apply
to the real estate and a 24% discount for lack of marketability to apply to all
120. Id.
121.
April 19, 1996 July 2, 1996
Minority Minority
Percent of Interest Percent of Interest
Net Asset Discount Net Asset Discount
Value Factor Value Factor
Asset Class:
Marketable Securities 0.41 0.075 0.03075 0.43 0.075 0.03225
Real Estate 0.59 0.35 0.20650 0.57 0.3 0.17100
Weighted Average Minority
Interest Discount 0.23725 0.20325
Percent Total Value after
Minority Interest Discount 0.76275 0.79675
Marketability Discount Factor 0.35000 0.35000
Marketability Discount 0.26696 0.27886
Percent Value after Minority Interest
and Marketability Discount 0.49579 0.51789
Total Discount Percentage 0.5.0421 0.48211






Marketable Securities 0.41 0.085 0.03485
Real Estate 0.59 0.085 0.05015
Weighted Average Minority
Interest Discount 0.08500
Percent Total Value after
Minority Interest Discount 0.91500
Marketability Discount Factor 0.08300
Marketability Discount 0.07595
Percent Value after Minority Interest
and Marketability Discount 0.83906
Total Discount Percentage 0.16095
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assets."' The court's overall discount was 35.4% as of both valuation
dates.12
The experts' conclusions and the court's ultimate conclusion are summa-
rized as follows:
Lack of Control/Minority Interest
Marketable
Real Estate Securities Marketability Overall
Lappo April, 1996 35% 7.5% 35% 50.4%
July, 1996 30% 7.5% 35% 48.2%
IRS 8.5% 8.5% 8.3% 16.1%
Tax Court 19% 8.5% 24% 35.4%
B. Minority Interest Discount
In determining the fair market value of a minority interest in a closely
held business entity, such as a family limited partnership, it may be appropri-
ate to decrease NAV to reflect lack of control inherent in the interest.
26
1. Marketable Securities
The parties agreed to use the IRS's slightly higher discount of 8.5%.127
Petitioner's expert recommended a 7.5% minority interest discount while
respondent's expert recommended an 8.5% minority interest discount.1 28 As
the parties agreed that the difference was not significant, the court's opinion
does not state the methodologies used by the experts to determine these dis-
counts.
2. Real Estate
In determining the lack of control discount with respect to the real estate
"both experts agree[d] that publicly traded real estate investment trusts
124. Id. at 1438-40.
125.
Minority Interest Discount
determined by Court 0.15000
Percent Total Value after
Minority Interest Discount 0.85000
Marketability Discount Factor 0.24000
Marketability Discount 0.20400
Percent Value after Minority Interest
and Marketability Discount 0.64600
Total Discount Percentage 0.35400
126. Id. at 1434.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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(REIT's) provide[d] an appropriate starting point for determining the... dis-
count with regard to the partnership's real estate holdings."'29 "They dis-
agree[d], however, on which REIT's should be used for comparison and on
the analysis of the REIT's data.'
130
The petitioner's expert considered over 400 publicly traded REIT's and
real estate companies and selected seven. 3' Of these, three were REIT's and
four were real estate companies. 132 The court rejected all four real estate
companies as incomparable as they were separate tax-paying entities, unlike
Lappo FLP, a conduit entity.3 3 Furthermore, two were highly leveraged and
the other two were financially troubled, whereas Lappo FLP was neither.'"
With regard to the taxpayer's expert, the court concluded, "We are not per-
suaded that [the expert's] guideline group is sufficiently large or made up of
companies sufficiently comparable to the partnership.' 13 "While we have
utilized small samples in other valuation contexts, we have also recognized
the basic premise that '[a]s similarity to the company to be valued decreases,
the number of required comparables increases."
36
The taxpayer's expert attempted to confirm his 35% and 30% discounts
for lack of control by mentioning he had also examined fourteen publicly
registered, non-publicly traded real estate limited partnerships and found an
average discount from net asset value of 36%. 1 1 However, the court rejected
this attempt because the details of the study were not submitted into evidence
and real estate limited partnerships, as non-publicly traded entities, have very
limited trading volume, with the result that their discounts incorporate not
only lack of control, but also significant illiquidity.'38
The taxpayer's expert did not explain how he derived NAV which is crit-
ical to computation of a price-to-NAV discount. 39 He also offered no expla-
nation for upward adjustment of the companies' reported book values with a
directly corresponding upward effect on his price-to-NAV discount computa-
tions.' He further failed to adequately explain the apparent volatility in his
recommended price-to-NAV discounts over less than three months.'' The
court reasoned "that the volatility results from the small size of his sample






134. Id. at 1435 n.6.
135. Id. at 1435.
136. Id. (quoting McCord, 120 T.C. at 384 (quoting Estate of Heck v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2002-
038, at 175 (2002))).
137. Lappo, 84 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2003-258 at 1436.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at n. 9. (In determining a $25,928,000 NAV for Shopco as of July 2, 1996, taxpayer's expert start-
ed with a reported book value of $4,862,000 and adjusted it upward by $21,066,000).
141. Id.
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ship." '42 The Court indicated that after excluding the four real estate compa-
nies found to be dissimilar to the partnership, the median price-to-NAV rela-
tionship for the remaining three REIT's is, as of April 19, 1996, a 5.3 % dis-
count, and as of July 2, 1996, a .5 % premium which was generally in line
with the price-to-NAV data indicated by the IRS expert's guideline group. '43
The taxpayer's expert did not explain "how he quantified each factor, how
the factors were netted, or why [his] net effect [ ] result[s] in [ ] upward
adjustment to the median guideline company discounts, rather than a down-
ward adjustment .... "I44 "It seems most likely that [the taxpayer's expert's]
upward adjustments are, to some extent, plug numbers used to justify his
ultimate, very round minority interest discount figures of 35 percent and 30
percent for April 19, 1996, and July 2, 1996, respectively.
14 5
After rejecting the limited data and poorly founded conclusions of the
taxpayer's expert, the court turned to the analysis of the IRS's expert. The
IRS expert started with sixty-two real estate companies followed by an
investment research firm and eliminated ten that were not REIT's or were
otherwise not comparable. 46 The remaining fifty-two REIT's traded at a
4.8% premium over the net asset value estimated by the investment firm.4 7
The IRS's expert noted certain characteristics that made Lappo FLP less
attractive than the REIT's and consequently looked to the fifteenth percentile
of the data, which was a .8% discount as of March 25, 1996, and 1.48% pre-
mium as of June 25, 1996. '48 The court believed the size of his "sample was
sufficiently large to make tolerable dissimilarities between the partnership
and the REIT's in his guideline group.
'149
The taxpayer's expert criticized the use of an investment firm's REIT
data, suggesting that the investment firm's method of estimating the net asset
value of the REIT's was not comparable to the appraisal method used for
Lappo FLP's real estate. 15 1 Although not identical the valuation method used
by the investment firm "appears similar to that used to value the partner-
ship's real estate." ' "[E]ven if the valuation methods are not identical, inso-
far as each method is reliable and unbiased (and petitioner does not contend
that either is not), each might be expected to produce reasonable valuations
so as to provide a meaningful basis for comparing share prices to net asset
values. 15 2
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1436n.11.
144. Id. at 1436.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1436.
148. Id. at 1436-37.
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The IRS's expert claimed the REIT discount (or premium) reflected two
components: a discount for lack of control and a premium for liquidity."5 3 The
premium is based on the fact that publicly traded stock is more marketable
than directly owned real estate. The court accepted the methodology of the
IRS's expert, if not his conclusions. In particular, the court stated, "[I]n
quantifying that liquidity premium, however, we hesitate to rely on a single
academic study - particularly one that [the IRS's expert] did not participate
in preparing and could not elaborate upon first hand."'-' The court rejected
the concept of breaking the restricted stock discounts into three parts and
using only the illiquidity component and used the overall average of the
study, as well as other restricted stock studies, to calculate an average liquidi-
ty premium of 17.6%. 15 Combining this with the .8% REIT discount as of
April 1996 and rounding up, the court selected a 19% discount for lack of
control as of both valuation dates.
156
C. Marketability Discount
Because the liquidity premium and discount for lack of marketability are
based on the same data, the court arrived at a similar figure for the discount
for lack of marketability. First, the court rejected the data and conclusions of
the taxpayer's expert.5 7 Thirteen of the thirty-nine restricted stock transac-
tions used by him were rejected because they involved technology compa-
nies, which are considered riskier and incomparable.' 5 It was noted that they
had the highest discounts. 9 The remaining twenty-six transactions had a
median discount of 19.45%.1 °
The court favored the more extensive data of the IRS's expert - eighty-
eight transactions. However, the court took the overall discount of 22.21%
and averaged it with a study cited by the IRS's study to get a 21% bench-
mark discount for lack of marketability.'' The Court noted that this figure
was similar to the 19.45% discount derived from the data of the taxpayer's
expert after removing the technology companies.'62 The court then added
three percentage points to incorporate characteristics specific to the partner-
ship, to determine a marketability discount of 24%.16
153. Id. at 1437.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1437.
156. Id. at 1437-38.




161. Id. at 1439.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1439-40.
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V. ANALYSIS
In 2003, three cases were decided involving FLPs holding multiple
investments." 4 Although this note considers the Lappo v. Commissioner
case, minimal comparison should be made to the other two cases. After ini-
tial skirmishes, attempts to disqualify the partnership form were abandoned
or defeated resulting in pure valuation considerations.
A. Expert Opinions
Impressive expert opinions were presented by both sides in all three
cases. In all three cases, the court rejected the expert's conclusions from
their empirical studies but used the data for its conclusions.' Courts consis-
tently criticize experts from both sides yet engage in their own detailed analy-
sis using the expert's data apparently in recognition of the fact that valuation is
not an exact science. "A sound valuation [is] based upon all the relevant facts,
but the elements of common sense, informed judgment and reasonableness
must enter into the process of weighing those facts and determining their
aggregate significance.
'166
B. Lack of Control
1. Marketable Securities
The opinion in Lappo v. Commissioner did not state the methodology
used by the experts to determine marketable securities discounts, but they
presumably used closed-end mutual funds which are a common comparative
data source in discounts for lack of control for marketable securities. In
McCord v. Commissioner and Peracchio v. Commissioner, the experts uti-
lized closed-end mutual funds but the main dispute was the selection of
closed-end funds to include in the discount calculation." 7 The courts were
not satisfied with the experts conclusions and adopted compromise figures.
As the Lappo v. Commissioner expert and IRS expert did not substantially
disagree, the court agreed with the slightly higher IRS discount."6 8 It should
be noted that all three cases used a variation of the respective parties' expert
opinions.
164. Ted Israel, A Trio of FLP Valuation Cases: What Can Be Learned from McCord, Lappo, and
Peracehio?, 7 VALUATION STRATEGIES 12 (2004).
165. Id. at 14.
166. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
167. Israel, supra note 164, at 15, 17.
168. Lappo, 84 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2003-258 at 1439.
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2. Real Estate
In determining the lack of control discount with respect to the real estate
both experts agreed that publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REIT's)
provided an appropriate starting point.169 In a traditional analysis, REIT's are
publicly traded shares and represent a marketable minority interest. 70 The
difference between a controlling interest and a marketable minority interest is
a lack of control discount. A second discount, lack of marketability discount,
reduces a marketable minority interest to a non-marketable minority interest.
Admittedly, the traditional discount for lack of control also reflects some dif-
ferences in marketability.' Nevertheless, it brings the value down to a level
at which we can apply the traditional discount for lack of marketability,
which measures the difference between a publicly traded and non-publicly
traded stock.
The taxpayer expert in Lappo v. Commissioner based his analysis on
comparable publicly traded real estate companies and the IRS expert favored
REIT's.72 The taxpayer's expert identified seven companies and included
three when deriving his range of discounts and the court did not consider his
choices comparable or his sample large enough. 3 The IRS's expert included
fifty-two REIT's in his analysis.'74 The IRS expert's data yielded a median
price-to-NAV premium of 4.8%.'1 To be conservative, the expert looked
below the median to the fifteenth percentile." 6 This lowered the valuation
starting point to a .8% discount in March, 1996 and a 1.48% premium in
June, 1996.' However, this expert believed the difference between price
and NAV has two components: one positive (a liquidity premium) and one
negative (a minority discount). '78 "The liquidity premium exists because the
REIT allows the investor to own an illiquid asset (real estate) in a liquid
form."' 79 On the basis of the Bajaj study, the expert used a liquidity premium
of 7.5%.180 To arrive at the appropriate minority discount, this expert added
the liquidity premium to the .8% discount and 1.48% premium. 8' This
resulted in minority discounts of 8.3% and 6%. 8" The expert then compared
these results to his own study.'83 His study suggested that minority interests
169. Id. at 1434.
170. James R. Hitchner & Gary Roland, Marketability and Control Govern Value of Family Businesses,
52 TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS 24, 25, January (1994).
171. Id.
172. Lappo, 84 T.C.M. (RIA) P 2003-258 at 1434-35.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1435.
175. Id. at 1436.
176. Id. at 1437.
177. Id.
178. Israel, supra note 164, at 14.
179. Id. at 15.
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in holding companies trade at a discount of 8.5% relative to controlling inter-
ests.'" Therefore, he chose to use this more comparable discount.
The court did not agree with the liquidity premium espoused by the
IRS's expert. '85 Instead, the court used an average of three studies presented
by the IRS expert. 86 Employing the same formula used by the expert, the
court converted the average 15% liquidity discount to a 17.6% liquidity pre-
mium. '87 The court then added the premium to the price-to-NAV discount
and premium resulting in minority interest discounts of 18.4% and 16.12%.88
The court then rounded the discounts to arrive at a minority interest discount
of 19% for the FLP's real estate interests.'88
The minority discount analysis applied in Lappo v. Commissioner is
remarkably similar to the McCord v. Commissioner discount analysis.' 9 The
taxpayer's expert used seven REIT's compared to five in McCord v.
Commissioner.' The IRS expert in Lappo v. Commissioner relied on the
analysis provided by the IRS expert in McCord v. Commissioner.'92 Once
again, the court rejected the liquidity adjustment and computed its own.'93
The best measurement of a lack of control discount as it relates to real
estate was determined to be REIT's.' 9 The fact that both experts agreed
there should be a discount for lack of control, but the vast majority of the
REIT's traded at premiums to their supposed net asset values, suggests
strongly that the REIT's are in some way not comparable to Lappo v.
Commissioner.9 The IRS's expert in McCord v. Commissioner selected a
percentile for the REIT data that produced essentially a zero discount,
although in that case the percentile was the twenty-fifth.' 8
The IRS's experts in McCord v. Commissioner and Lappo v. Commissioner
attempt to isolate the pure discount for lack of control and bring the controlling
interest value down to the theoretical level of a minority interest that is exactly
as marketable as the underlying assets themselves.' 97 In both McCord v.
Commissioner and Lappo v. Commissioner, the IRS's expert started with a
traditional discount for lack of control essentially equal to zero, then adjusted







190. Israel, supra note 164, at 16.
191. Id.




196. Id. at 15.
197. Id. at 16-17.
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reach a discount roughly equal to 7.2% (8.34% in McCord v. Commissioner
and 8.5% in Lappo v. Commissioner).98 Subsequently the IRS's expert takes
an illiquidity discount that is also roughly equal to 7.2% (7.0% in McCord v.
Commissioner and 8.3% in Lappo v. Commissioner), so the total discount is
roughly equal to two times the illiquidity discount. '99 The experts' efforts to
obtain a pure discount for lack of control were merely an exercise. The court
disregarded this futile exercise in both Lappo v. Commissioner and McCord
v. Commissioner.
In the three opinions, marketability is not defined by liquidity alone. As
in McCord v. Commissioner and Lappo v. Commissioner, the parties in
Peracchio v. Commissioner "agreed that NAV less minority and marketabili-
ty discounts was the proper approach to value the partnership.""2 ' The courts
also agreed that the best measurement of lack of control discount relating to
real estate is REIT. The discount from NAV observed in publicly traded
REIT's is composed of both a liquidity premium and a minority discount."1
The liquidity premium must be isolated and removed in order to derive the
minority discount properly.
The experts' conclusions and the court's ultimate conclusion are summa-
rized as follows:
IRS Expert Taxpayer's Expert Court
McCord 8.34% 22% 15%
Lappo 8.5% 30-35% 19%
Peracchio 4.4% 5-7.7% 6%
C. Marketability
The experts agreed that empirical studies of marketability
discounts fall into two categories: IPO studies and restricted
stock studies. The IPO studies compare the price of shares
before and after an initial public offering. The difference or
discount is attributed to the pre-IPO shares' lack of mar-
ketability. The restricted stock studies compare transaction
prices of restricted shares in public companies with their
unrestricted counterparts. [T]he difference or discount is
attributed to the restricted shares' lack of marketability. 22
198. Id. at 15-16.
199. Id. at 15, 17.
200. Id. at 17.
201. Id. at 47.
202. Id. at 15.
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The court in McCord v. Commissioner listened to both experts and then
related the FLP characteristics to the middle group of the IRS expert's
study.203 The taxpayer expert in McCord v. Commissioner relied primarily on
the restricted stock studies in arriving at a 35% marketability discount.20 4 The
court found flaws in the expert's testimony. It felt that he failed to adequate-
ly relate the partnership's key operating elements to those studies.
Consequently, the court gave little weight to his restricted stock analysis.
The IRS expert in McCord v. Commissioner hypothesized that discounts
observed in restricted stock studies are attributable in part to factors other
than impaired marketability resulting in only a 7% discount.0 The court was
impressed with his analysis, however it pointed out that he had isolated the
liquidity portion of the discount, and the court was unable to accept that liq-
uidity alone equated to marketability. Therefore, the court, not persuaded by
the evidence, used the discount applicable to the average, 20.36%. o0
The court in Lappo v. Commissioner followed the rationale of McCord v.
Commissioner. The taxpayer expert determined his marketability discount
based on restricted stock studies.0 7 "The court did not agree with his select-
ed guideline group and gave his testimony little weight."2 8 The IRS expert
used the McCord v. Commissioner analysis. Therefore,
The court cited McCord v. Commissioner in justifying its
rejection of 7.2% as the appropriate starting point for deter-
mining the partnership's marketability discount. The court
once again examined the data in the cited studies, which indi-
cated an average discount of 21%. Based on its assessment of
characteristics specific to the partnership, the court adjusted
the discount upward to 24%. "209
In Peracchio "[t]here was not much offered by either side in support of
their opinions regarding marketability discounts."21' Peracchio's experts
were seeking a 35% discount and contended that precedent provided a
benchmark discount in the range of 35% - 45%.211 "The court disagreed." '212
Peracchio's "experts also made reference to restricted stock studies and the
203. McCord, 120 T.C. at 395.
204. Id. at 388.
205. Id. at 393.
206. Id. at 395.
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range of discounts implied therein, but without relating them in any way to
the [FLP]. ' '1 The IRS's "report stated that the discount should be in the
range of 5% - 25%, but it did not offer any real quantitative support for the
15% he claimed." '214 The court split the difference.
Overall, the court looks first at the data used by both experts and favors
the more extensive data. Then the court considers the arguments made by
both experts and deviates from the averages of the studies only where the
argument was well reasoned and supported by the data. The experts' conclu-
sions and the court's ultimate conclusion are summarized as follows:
IRS Expert Taxpayer's Expert Court
McCord 7% 35% 20%
Lappo 8.3% 35% 24%
Peracchio 15% 35-45% 25%
VI. CONCLUSION
In many ways, the IRS and the courts are accountable for the prolifera-
tion of FLPs as an estate planning tool. While the judges are not experts in
valuation, they must balance the IRS's tendency to present high valuations
with the taxpayer's tendency to present lower valuations. "The court's prac-
tice of 'splitting the difference' has no conceptual, theoretical or intellectual-
ly convincing basis and tends to be grounded, quite simply, in expedien-
cy."'215 The lessons to be learned from this are that courts favor: comparable
detailed data; sound empirical data to justify deviations from the norm; and
significant data to justify conclusions.
When an interest in property is transformed into an interest in an entity,
the relevant consideration for transfer tax valuation purposes becomes the
interest in the entity subject to the restrictions imposed in the agreement itself
as well as those imposed by state law. Therefore, that interest must be dis-
counted. The courts have thus made possible the principle that the sum of




215. Stephen J. Leacock, The Anatomy of Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Pursuing Phantom
of Objectivity into the New Millennium, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 161, 168 (2001).
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